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ABSTRACT
Web crawlers are widely used software programs designed to
automatically search the online universe to find and collect
information. The data that crawlers provide help make sense of the
vast and often chaotic nature of the Web. Crawlers find websites and
content that power search engines and online marketplaces. As
people and organizations put an ever-increasing amount of
information online, tech companies and researchers deploy more
advanced algorithms that feed on that data. Even governments and
law enforcement now use crawlers to carry out their missions.
Despite the ubiquity of crawlers, their use is ambiguously regulated
largely by online social norms whereby webpage headers signal
whether automated “robots” are welcome to crawl their sites. As
courts take on the issues raised by web crawlers, user privacy hangs
in the balance. In August 2017, the Northern District of California
granted a preliminary injunction in such a case, deciding that
*
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LinkedIn’s website must be open to such crawlers. In March 2018,
the District Court for the District of Columbia granted standing for
an as-applied challenge to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to a
group of academic researchers and a news organization. The Court
allowed them to proceed with a case in which they now allege the
law’s making a violation of website Terms of Service a crime
effectively prohibits web crawling and infringes on their First
Amendment Rights. In addition, news media is inundated with
stories like Cambridge Analytica wherein web crawlers were used
to scrape data from millions of Facebook accounts for political
purposes.
This paper discusses the history of web crawlers in courts as
well as the uses of such programs by a wide array of actors. It
addresses ethical and legal issues surrounding the crawling and
scraping of data posted online for uses not intended by the original
poster or by the website on which the information is hosted. The
article further suggests that stronger rules are necessary to protect
the users’ initial expectations about how their data would be used,
as well as their privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Scientists, researchers, private industry, and government are
tuning in to the changes in information-gathering and analysis
brought about by big data. Where relatively small data projects—
public opinion surveys, questionnaires, or other similar projects—
were once used to provide answers to scientific, business, and civic
questions, we can now turn to the much larger store of information
on the Internet to try to find better or faster answers to those same
questions. Using algorithms and artificial intelligence, we can
increase efficiency, augment labor, and complete tasks that are too
massive, complicated, or otherwise difficult for humans to
realistically complete.
Private companies like Google, Microsoft, and others have for
decades provided answers—or, more commonly, provided a list of
locations where one might find an answer. They use web crawlers
to search and index the web to provide reliable, relevant web pages
in response to search queries. 1 Further, these algorithms index a
relatively small portion of the worldwide web,2 and much less of the
broader internet. Not only do these crawlers search a limited number
of websites, they also save little information from them. Search
engines tend to care only about which websites link to which other
websites, maintaining headlines and snippets of text to display to
users, or saving thumbnails of images for the same reason. Much of
1

See
e.g.,
How
Google
Search
Works,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/70897?hl=en (last visited May 1,
2018).
2
See Andy Beckett, The Dark Side of the Internet, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
25, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/nov/26/dark-sideinternet-freenet.
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the data stored on the web is ignored by crawlers entirely, and not
scraped for indexing and searching.3 But this data is the raw material
for big data analytics, machine learning algorithms, and similar tools
that attempt to analyze, inform, and predict.
While web crawlers are mostly used to collect the relatively
limited information necessary to power search engines, they can be
used to search, index, and later analyze vast amounts of information
on the internet. Increased storage capabilities and computing power
are making such usage more practical. Governments can use web
crawlers to find criminals operating online. Researchers can use
them to identify social trends or political opinions. Private
companies may try to glean information about their customers and
their preferences from data scrapped from forums, blogs, social
media websites, or elsewhere.
These basic functions, long used for well understood purposes,
will soon be—or are already being—used to provide the raw data
for analyses that many may consider uncomfortable, unethical, or
even illegal. They can provide the images necessary to feed a facial
recognition system, the content needed to search for violent
extremists, or to jump-start a business using data someone else
already collected.
This raises a number of questions about the use of such software
and the status of the websites they crawl. For this reason, a number
of institutions have sought to address this issue. The American
Association for Public Opinion Research published its own report
identifying data ownership, data stewardship, data collection
authority, privacy and reidentification, and data protection as policy
challenges to be addressed. 4 The White House, under President
Obama, also released a report on big data discussing government
uses and providing a background on U.S. privacy law, ranging from
3

See J.J. Rosen, The Internet You Can’t Google, TENNESSEAN,
https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/tech/2014/05/02/jj-rosen-popularsearch-engines-skim-surface/8636081/ (last updated May 3, 2014) (reporting that
Google indexes “only an estimated 4 percent of the information that exists on the
Internet.”).
4
See Lilli Japec et al., AAPOR Report: Big Data, AM. ASS’N FOR PUB.
OPINION RES. (Feb.
12,
2015),
https://www.aapor.org/EducationResources/Reports/Big-Data.aspx#3.2%20Paradigm%20Shift.
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy, to the
Fair Information Practice Principles and the Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights. 5 The report, among other things, discussed big data’s
effect on citizenship, discrimination, and privacy, and made a
number of general recommendations, including a national data
breach standard, developing technical expertise to stop
discrimination, and amending the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA).6
Prior discussions have failed to provide implementable
technology or policy solutions, leaving many questions unanswered.
In the context of government use, can crawling and scraping ever
constitute a search or seizure that would be governed by the Fourth
Amendment? More broadly, as applied to the private sector and
researchers, do internet users have a privacy interest in what they
post online? How and when does such an interest operate? What
kind of policies should crawlers obey to protect those searched? Do
current federal laws apply to these activities, and do they have the
necessary force to meaningfully protect internet users’ data from
being made part of a database that will be used for purposes users
did not or could not foresee?
Technology often advances ahead of law and policy. Web
crawlers are currently governed almost entirely by social norms and
politeness, and neither Congress, the executive branch, nor the
courts have promulgated laws or guidelines specifically governing
their use as tools of surveillance. Without any such rules, there is a
near certainty that someone’s privacy has already been, or will soon
be violated, their statements connected to their true identity, online
posts used against them in court, or some unforeseen harm caused.
This article will discuss the problems raised by big data and web
crawling from an ethical and legal standpoint. The question of how
to regulate crawling and scraping data with bots by government, the
private sector, researchers, and individuals will be examined with
the goal of identifying issues and highlighting specific dilemmas for
policymakers to address before widespread surveillance using web
5

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING
VALUES,
(May
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_
report_may_1_2014.pdf.
6
Id. at 60.
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crawlers can cause undue harm.
I. WEB CRAWLERS
Web Crawlers, also called bots, spiders, and crawlers are in
common use on the web. Perhaps of most familiarity to the average
internet user, their work product is on display whenever one uses a
search engine like Google. Search engines employ crawlers to
systematically scan, analyze, and save information about websites
to index those sites for searching, determine their importance to a
particular search, and find connections between websites.7
Web crawlers visit websites at the direction of their operators,
but often with little everyday input from them. Operators may
choose all the web pages that a crawler will visit, but more often
they are driven by algorithms making that determination. For
example, Googlebot, the web crawler Google uses to inform its
search engine, uses an algorithm to determine what to crawl based
on data from previous crawls.8 These crawlers may visit a given web
page a number of times a day to ensure data is collected in a timely
fashion.9 Often, there is a way for website operators to submit their
URLs manually to request that a bot crawl their websites. 10
Nevertheless, crawls are often automatic and informed by the
sample of the web searched, necessitating that some websites will
be left out, and leading to some amount of bias in the results of the
crawl. Web crawlers can provide information in real time.11
Because crawlers are so active and bandwidth is limited,
crawlers generally operate politely, in accordance with social
7
See Javed Mostafa, How do Internet Search Engines Work?, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Oct. 14, 2002) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-dointernet-search-en/.
8
See Googlebot, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer
/182072?hl=en (last visited May 1, 2018).
9
See What Are Crawlers? How Do They Work?, SEO MARKETING WORLD,
http://www.seomarketingworld.com/seo-faq/crawlers.php (last visited May 1,
2018).
10
See How Does a Robot Decide Where to Visit?, ROBOTSTXT.ORG,
http://www.robotstxt.org/faq/visit.html (last visited May 1, 2018).
11
See David Harry, Crawling and the Real Time Web, SEJ (Apr. 29, 2010),
https://www.searchenginejournal.com/crawling-and-the-real-time-web/20510/.
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norms—the desires of website operators are stored in the code of
their websites. Crawlers, poorly designed or left to run freely, can
use significant network resources or even crash servers.12 For this
reason, a protocol exists to temper the crawls performed by these
bots. Website administrators use the Robots Exclusion Protocol, or
“robots.txt”, to ask crawlers not to search particular pages of their
website, or to leave it un-crawled entirely.13 This file can be targeted
at specific bots (for example, telling only Googlebot not to index a
page), or at all bots.14 Some robots will also respect requests to time
delays between crawls to conserve network resources.15 However,
robots.txt can be ignored; those employing crawlers are not bound
by any law, contract, or technical need to obey a robots.txt file.16
Only politeness and social pressure provide enforcement power.
There are other methods of keeping crawlers out, such as requiring
users to log in, or fill in a captcha, but those too can be sidestepped
by a bot’s programmers.17
As technology advances, web crawlers are able to scrape more
data from websites. Where it may not have been possible to save all
the text or images from a website in the past, as the cost of storage
has gone down, the operators of a web crawler can now scrape and
store far more information, including comments and the identities of
those who posted them, advertisements, and pictures.
Advancements in facial recognition technology allow people in
images to be identified, and disparate online identities can be
12
See Aren’t Robots Bad for the Web?, ROBOTSTXT.ORG,
http://www.robotstxt.org/faq/bad.html (last visited May 1, 2018) (“Certain robot
implementations can (and have in the past) overloaded networks and servers. This
happens especially with people who are just starting to write a robot; these days
there is sufficient information on robots to prevent some of these mistakes.”).
13
See About /robots.txt, ROBOTSTXT.ORG, http://www.robotstxt.org/
robotstxt.html (last visited May 1, 2018) (explaining how to use robots.txt to allow
robots complete access, exclude robots entirely, exclude or allow particular
robots, or how to disallow crawling of particular pages).
14
Id.
15
See Robots.txt Tutorial, SEOBOOK, http://tools.seobook.com/robots-txt/
(last visited May 1, 2018).
16
Can a /robots.txt Be Used in a Court of Law?, ROBOTSTXT.ORG,
http://www.robotstxt.org/faq/legal.html (last visited May 1, 2018).
17
See, e.g., Tim Anderson, How Captcha Was Foiled: Are You a Man or a
Mouse?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2008/aug/28/internet.captcha.
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connected to a real person.
II. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Web crawlers provide the ability for any sufficiently
sophisticated and funded operator to maintain a fairly ubiquitous
surveillance regime over a larger number of internet domains. This
has serious implications for the privacy of internet users. Web
crawlers can be used for widespread tracking of internet users
without their knowledge or consent. When paired with other
technologies, these crawlers can successfully deanonymize people
who post online under pseudonyms, or even identify people who
have merely had pictures of them posted by others.
Web crawlers can be used to easily acquire large amounts of
information, including who posts on which websites, who they
interact with, and what they post. This may reveal political,
religious, and other views of users, along with significant personal
information. Some government agencies already use various
methods to track protests and protesters,18 and eight out of ten law
enforcement professionals use social media as a tool in their
investigations.19 Web crawlers enable government agents to quickly
collect data from web forums, personal blogs, social networking
sites like Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr, or bulletin boards like
Craigslist. Web crawlers also allow government agents to collect
data from protest groups’ websites to determine the number of
18

See, e.g., George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives
Matter
Since
Ferguson,
THE
INTERCEPT
(July
24,
2015),
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/24/documents-show-departmenthomeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson
(explaining
that the Department of Homeland Security collected information, “including
location data . . . from public social media accounts, including on Facebook,
Twitter, and Vine, even for events expected to be peaceful. . . . They also show
the department watching over gatherings that seem benign and even mundane. . .
. [A] DHS-funded agency planned to monitor a funk music parade and a walk to
end breast cancer in the nation’s capital.”).
19
See Social Media Use in Law Enforcement: Crime Prevention and
Investigative Activities Continue to Drive Usage, LEXISNEXIS, at 2 (Nov. 2014),
https://risk.lexisnexis.com/-/media/files/government/white-paper/2014-socialmedia-use-in-law-enforcement-pdf.pdf [hereinafter LEXISNEXIS].
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protestors, identify the protestors, and discover their motivations.20
These activities have important constitutional implications as they
could chill protected speech, infringe on protester’s freedom of
association, or violate a person’s Fourth Amendment right to
protection against unreasonable searches. Corporations and
researchers are also using crawlers to scrape internet data to inform
their business practices and research. 21 While these corporate
practices do not implicate the same constitutional rights as
government use of crawlers, they do have significant bearing on the
privacy rights of internet users whose data is collected. Not only
might the initial collection by corporations or researchers violate the
privacy of internet users, but poor security practices could result in
data breaches putting personal data in the hands of people with
malicious motives.
This collection of information can be done without the
knowledge or consent of those posting. Users post online with
certain expectations about how their posts will be used, and while
they may use websites that include privacy controls or have terms
of service (ToS) forbidding crawling, these may be circumvented.
Privacy controls are often too confusing for users to employ
effectively,22 and in any case do not control what others post. And,
as discussed above, very little controls the ability of web crawlers to
scrape data from a web page. 23 This means that government
20

See Richard Esposito et al., Showden Docs Reveal British Spies Snooped
on
YouTube
and Facebook, NBC NEWS (Jan. 27,
2014),
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docsreveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook. In 2012, the British
Government Communications Headquarters demonstrated the ability to monitor
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter in real time; this sort of information apparently
has value to governments interested in monitoring online activity.
21
See discussion infra Part V.
22
See Josh Constine, Facebook Admits Users Are Confused About Privacy,
Will Show More On-Screen Explanations, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/08/facebook-privacy-settings/
(“Facebook’s
privacy team manager Mike Nowak admitted that people think Facebook changes
its privacy controls too often or that the company has failed to make privacy easy
to understand.”).
23
See, e.g., How Do I Prevent Robots Scanning My Site?, ROBOTS.TXT,
http://www.robotstxt.org/faq/prevent.html (last visited May 1, 2018) (providing
advice on how to prevent scraping by crawlers, but noting “this only helps with
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agencies, corporations, or others can easily navigate around users’
expectations, collecting whatever data they want without the
subjects of the surveillance ever learning of the collection, much less
having a chance to consent.
This sort of tracking, scraping, and storage of information allows
governments to engage in further invasions of privacy beyond
merely collecting information on individuals as they interact both
online and offline. Such practices have serious implications for
unmasking real identities online.
Facial recognition technology can, to varying degrees,
accurately identify a person in a picture.24 This allows a government
agency, or others, to scrape images from websites to identify the
people in the photos, creating a database of users, their
acquaintances, and friends. Because metadata is often uploaded with
such photos, the times and locations of users’ meetings may also be
collected. To an increasing extent, clear images of peoples’ faces are
not necessary as computers are being trained to identify people
based on factors like hair style, clothing, body shape, and pose.25
Users cannot avoid this sort of surveillance by refraining from
taking pictures of themselves, or by asking their friends not to post
photos or tag them. It is possible that images posted by strangers
may lead to ones’ identification in the background of a picture with
an entirely different subject.
Such crawling and scraping can also be used to unmask aliases.
Crawlers may scrape information like physical addresses, email
addresses, phone numbers, or linked accounts that can be used to
link aliases to each other, or to link an alias to a real-world identity,
stymying attempts to speak anonymously. While this is certainly
well-behaved robots.”).
24
See Russell Brandom, Why Facebook is Beating the FBI at Facial
Recognition, THE VERGE (July 7, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/7/7/
5878069/why-facebook-is-beating-the-fbi-at-facial-recognition; see also James
Geddes, Windows 10 Hello Facial Recognition Feature Can Distinguish Between
Identical Twins, TECH TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/
79108/20150825/windows-10-hello-facial-recognition-feature-can-distinguishbetween-identical-twins.htm (describing a small test undertaken by a journalist).
25
Aviva Rutkin, Facebook can Recognise You in Photos Even if You’re Not
Looking, NEW SCIENTIST (June 22, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/
dn27761-facebook-can-recognise-you-in-photos-even-if-youre-notlooking#.VYjUthNVhBd.

2018]

ROBOTS WELCOME?

285

possible without crawlers, crawlers’ ability to search constantly and
systematically increases the chances that a user’s mistake or private
material will be found and taken advantage of. Further, this can be
done on a large scale, leading to the potential unmasking of a great
number of aliases.
Crawlers are accessible to nearly anyone with a bit of technical
expertise and access to the necessary computing resources to
complete their task. While government crawling and scraping has
implications for the privacy as well as the First and Fourth
Amendment rights of U.S. citizens, application of these tools by
private entities is not without risks.
III. GOVERNMENT CRAWLING AND SCRAPING
Government agencies, from the federal level to local police
departments, are already putting information they find online to use.
Law enforcement uses social media to anticipate crime,26 but nearly
half of law enforcement agencies have no formal process governing
the use of social media for their investigations.27 This leaves open
the possibility of abuse and allows law enforcement professionals to
ignore privacy expectations of internet users. The federal
government uses data mining to find terrorists by looking for
relationships between people and connections between behaviors,
and has programs aimed at analyzing “massive” data sets.28
Government searches are governed by the Fourth Amendment.29
Yet whether web crawlers constitute a search under the Amendment
is unsettled. There are generally two possible interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections: The Third-Party
26

See LEXISNEXIS, supra note 19, at 3.
See LEXISNEXIS, supra note 19, at 2.
28
See Jeffrey W. Seifert, Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview,
CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONG., RL31798, at 26 (April 3, 2008),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31798.pdf.
29
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Persistent surveillance online also could have a
significant chilling effect on speech. For its First Amendment implications, see
Karen Gullo, Surveillance Chills Speech—As New Studies Show—And Free
Association Suffers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (May 19, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/when-surveillance-chills-speech-newstudies-show-our-rights-free-association.
27
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Doctrine, and a more contextual view of privacy focusing on the
amount the surveillance uncovers about a person’s life.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment’s limitation on unreasonable searches
applies only to public actors, but it carries great weight in the
discussion of online privacy concerns, as the government exercises
vast power online to monitor user activity. 30 The Fourth
Amendment goes a long distance in shaping the public’s perception
of their rights in relation to private actors as well, while they are not
actually bound by those same constitutional guarantees.
For many years after its conception, courts understood the
Fourth Amendment as protecting against a physical invasion of
privacy, including a government agent’s trespass onto land, or the
physical taking of a private citizen’s possession. 31 More ephemeral
information—like conversations overheard from a location a
government agent had a right to be—were granted no protection.32
It is unclear to what degree trespass may apply to online actions,
making it uncertain whether the Fourth Amendment binds
government searches online based on a theory of trespass.
Some courts hold that a claim for civil trespass can be sustained
based on the use of server resources by a web crawler.33 In cases
where web crawlers used rather small amounts of server resources
to search and scrape data from websites, claims against the operators
of those web crawlers for trespass have stood. 34 This theory of
30

See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything
a User Does on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-onlinedata.
31
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (discussing the history
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
32
See id.
33
See e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
34
See id.; but see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No.
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003)
(“This court respectfully disagrees with other district courts' finding that mere use
of a spider to enter a publically available web site to gather information, without
more, is sufficient to fulfill the harm requirement for trespass to chattels.”).
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online trespass is not widely accepted, 35 but it could subject
government web crawls to the Fourth Amendment. The architecture
of the modern web, which puts nearly everyone’s data on someone
else’s computer through the use of cloud computing, may hamper
the use of this doctrine online. The government would not be
trespassing on the end user’s computer, but onto some company’s.
In such a case, the end user may never find out, forcing them to rely
on others to notify them or to enforce their rights.
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Katz,36
explaining that the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”37 The Court held that a person making a phone call in a
phone booth had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
conversation, thus preventing government eavesdropping without a
warrant. 38 In later cases, the Court elaborated that a search is
unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment when the target
of the search has manifested an expectation of privacy that society
considers reasonable.39
B. The Third-Party Doctrine
The Third-Party Doctrine states that there is “no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information [one] voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”40 A number of cases decided before the creation of
the Internet provide for significant government access to records and
other information. Applying this doctrine, the courts determined that
a number of records held by institutions for or about individuals are
unprotected regardless of the use for which they are shared.41 Courts
35
See Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3 (“[S]cholars and practitioners
alike have criticized the extension of the trespass to chattels doctrine to the
internet context, noting that this doctrinal expansion threatens basic internet
functions (i.e., search engines) and exposes the flaws inherent in applying
doctrines based in real and tangible property to cyberspace.”).
36
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37
Id. at 351.
38
Id. at 353.
39
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
40
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
41
See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976).
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held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the government
from obtaining information revealed to a third party, even if the
information was revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.42 This doctrine neatly fits into the Katz test,
which protects people when they take action to keep their
information private. The Third-Party Doctrine adds the presumption
that a person can have no legitimate expectation of privacy in shared
information.
The impact of the Third-Party doctrine may have been
reasonable when it was adopted, but its impact on privacy online is
plain and oversized. Online, all of one’s activities are shared with a
third party. Emails are shared with an email client. The websites one
visits are shared with an ISP, and any number of entities that have
attached cookies to the browser being used. Everything one does
online is shared by the very nature of the Internet; even while
browsing alone, some intermediary between one’s PC and the server
contacted is recording an exchange of packets. As a result, privacy
rights are significantly curtailed online. For example, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, passed in 1986,43 provides protection
against the search and seizure of emails in transit, in storage on a
home computer, or stored on what would now be called the “cloud”
for 180 days or less. The government must obtain a warrant for such
data. 44 For email stored in the cloud for more than 180 days, or
opened and stored in the cloud, the government can compel
disclosure with only a subpoena.45 This constitutes less protection
than email stored locally, on one’s computer (or on paper, in a file
cabinet) would get.
C. Contextual Privacy
The views of the Fourth Amendment described above, and the
Third-Party Doctrine, assume a black and white view of privacy
where any sharing of information, regardless of the purpose,
42

See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
44
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018).
45
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).
43
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removes any privacy the user could have expected to have in that
information. A more nuanced view of privacy is possible, through
which internet users would not be denied their privacy based on
technical necessities, nor their activities treated as an entirely new
realm deserving of a new view of privacy. Instead, the context of the
use should be determinative.46 Just as a patient would be shocked if
a doctor shared his information with marketers, but would likely
have little issue with that same information being shared with an
insurance company or pharmacist,47 privacy expectations online are
contextual.48 Users share their emails with Google and may expect
ads to be shown to them based on the content of those emails, but
may not expect those emails to be shared with the government.49
Under a contextual view, a person’s privacy level would depend on
the use of the technology.
Of course, applying offline rules to online activities could mean
applying the Third-Party Doctrine. But some recent Supreme Court
cases might point to a changing view on that issue. In United States
v. Jones, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that long-term
tracking of a suspect using a GPS device placed on the suspect’s car
required a warrant.50 This ruling has significant implications for web
crawling. Addressing long-term tracking first, the Court held that it
was not reasonable to expect that a government agent would follow
someone for a long period of time. Online surveillance and web
crawling allow the government to do just that, searching the web
and scraping websites for every trace a given user leaves, going back
in time as far as any website maintains its data.
46
See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 (4)
DÆDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI.
32,
38
(2011)
http://www.amacad.org/publications/daedalus/11_fall_nissenbaum.pdf.
47
This hypothetical ignores, for the sake of argument, the significant laws
that govern the handling of medical information and focuses merely on consumer,
or patient, expectations.
48
Nissenbaum, supra note 46, at 38.
49
Additionally, in the particular case of email, the change in how email is
used since the passage of ECPA and the routine storage of large numbers of emails
and other documents in the cloud, rather than on home computers, bolsters the
argument that users do expect a different amount of privacy than ECPA provides,
at the very least.
50
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
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A concurrence by four justices rejected the majority’s trespassbased approach and determined that a reasonable person did not
expect to be tracked with a GPS unit over a long period of time,
which in this case, was about a month.51 The reasoning of the four
concurring justices, adopting a new approach to apply to persistent,
long-term tracking which was either impossible or prohibitively
expensive in the past, may signal a coming change in how such cases
are decided. Such a view may even lead to a significant curtailing,
if not the end, of the Third-Party Doctrine.
Justice Sotomayor, in her own concurrence, expressed concern
over the application of trespass in the electronic age given that many
forms of surveillance require no trespass. For instance, tracking the
GPS chip in a suspect’s phone, rather than placing one somewhere
on his person or possessions. 52 Justice Sotomayor was explicitly
worried about electronic surveillance and went as far as suggesting
that the Third-Party Doctrine be reconsidered. She said the approach
was “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks.” 53 As one scholar put it, “all
communications over the Internet . . . are stored for various lengths
of time on third party servers or Internet service providers.”54 Justice
Sotomayor cited Katz for the proposition that “what [a person] seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.”55 Further, computers, including those
online or in the cloud, are routinely used to hold the sorts of
documents, photographs, and other private matters that were
previously kept in the home.56 Without changes to the Third-Party
Doctrine, these documents would lose protection merely because of
where they are stored.
51

Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
53
Id. at 417.
54
Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party
Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
55
Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52
(1967)).
56
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 654–55
(2011).
52
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In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court discussed how
searches of cell phones can reveal far more than just one sort of
information contained in them would otherwise reveal. 57 In this
case, the government searched a cell phone incident to arrest.58 The
Court reaffirmed that searches of cell phones under this authority
must occur to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence, and
otherwise require a warrant or exigent circumstances. 59 However,
recognizing the difference between collecting large and small
amounts of information has clear implications for government use
of web crawlers.
Although neither Jones nor Riley addressed online surveillance
specifically, it seems clear that long-term surveillance, or
surveillance that covers a wide variety of information (and perhaps
even information shared online in at least some contexts) may not
be completely unprotected under the Fourth Amendment. These
cases drew a line based on the amount of data collected; they alleged
that when the government collects enough data, even if it is public,
the nature of the collection can change and violate a persons’
privacy.
Scholars have suggested new ways to apply the Fourth
Amendment online in a way that would protect the privacy of those
who share information online. One way is to protect content, while
allowing the government to collect non-content information.60 This
was proposed as being similar to the inside/outside distinction
applied in physical space, in which people have a greater degree of
protection under the Fourth Amendment inside, in private spaces,
than they do outside, in public. 61 This is also similar to the
57

See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
Id. at 2482.
59
Id. at 2483.
60
See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (2010). Non-content
information, or metadata, is information “related to identity, location, and time.”
Id. at 1018. Metadata could feasibly include email addresses, account names, IP
addresses, or other similar information. See also Chris Conley, Metadata: Piecing
Together a Privacy Solution, ACLU OF CALIFORNIA (Feb. 2014),
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/Metadata%20report%20FINAL%202
%2021%2014%20cover%20%2B%20inside%20for%20web%20%283%29.pdf.
61
Kerr, supra note 60, at 1009.
58
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protections currently applied to post mail and telephone calls,62 but
may draw critics based on the revealing nature of metadata.63
Alternatively, one could apply Fourth Amendment protections
online based on the “structure of the particular technology” and “the
particular uses to which an individual puts the technology.”64 Under
such an approach, password protected information stored in the
cloud would be protected, even if it were non-content information,
just as if it were held in a filing cabinet in one’s home. 65
Determining how to deal with social media is difficult under this
approach, but could be determined based on the amount of control
the user maintains over access to the information, even if the owner
of the platform has access for certain purposes.66 The court could
ask if “assuming privacy settings are optional, [the ‘resident’] chose
privacy settings that would support a finding that his [social media
sites are] sufficiently restricted that they are not readily available to
the general public.” 67 Just as in determining whether to treat a
physical space as a residence, courts should not inquire too closely
into the specific uses an individual chooses to make of an online
social space; an individual does not have a lesser basic expectation
of privacy against the government in their home simply because they
have frequent parties or have a large number of guests.68
Finally, the Fourth Amendment could be read to protect certain
“structural privacy rights.” 69 Acknowledging that prior to certain
technological advancements, some forms of surveillance were too
expensive to employ, the courts should strive to maintain protections
at that level. For example, while following a given person was once
prohibitively expensive, one can now be followed electronically
with the use of the GPS chip in one’s phone. A rule designed to
62

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1032.
64
Strandburg, supra note 56, at 659–60.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 661–62.
67
Id. at 663 (citing Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965,
991 (C.D. Cal. 2010)).
68
Id.
69
See Kevin S. Bankstson & Askan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. 335, 339
(2014).
63
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protect a structural privacy right would use the Fourth Amendment
to impose legal costs where there were once economic costs.70
IV. PRIVATE SECTOR CRAWLING
The private sector may have many uses for crawling and for
scraped data beyond those discussed above. Companies can use
them to gather information on their customers’ views on certain
products they’ve purchased. They can gather information about
pricing on their competitors’ websites. They could also be used to
gather significant amounts of information on their customers from
personal blogs, social media sites, forums, and other websites where
users may talk about or otherwise make their identity or their
preferences known. This could allow companies to gather large
dossiers of sensitive information with few, if any, rules about what
can be gathered, when and where it can be gathered from, along with
generally weak rules about the storage of information. This section
will discuss the case law applicable to corporate use of web crawlers
and the policy implications of corporate use. Some sectors of the
U.S. economy are governed by industry-specific privacy
regulations.71
A. Trespass
In eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, a California district court was faced
with determining whether Bidder’s Edge, an auction aggregation
site, could crawl eBay’s website, scrape information on bids, and
provide search results to its own users.72 The court held that such
unpermitted crawling amounted to trespass, and ordered an
injunction to stop Bidder’s Edge from continuing its crawling and
scraping of eBay. 73 The court came to this decision even though
Bidder’s Edge used very little of eBay’s server resources (a couple
of percent, at most), and did not damage the property, though it did
70

Id.
These privacy regulations will be discussed where applicable, but they are
relatively narrow in scope and are largely outside the scope of this paper.
72
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1067 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
73
Id. at 1069–70.
71
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prevent eBay from using a small percent of server resources for
other uses.
Another California court attempted to apply this “ancient
common law action to the modern age.” 74 Prior courts held that
“mere invasion or use of a portion of the web site by a spider is a
trespass (leading at least to nominal damages), and that there need
not be an independent showing of direct harm either to the chattel
(unlikely in the case of a spider) or tangible interference with the use
of the computer being invaded.”75 The Ticketmaster court, however,
required a showing that the computer being crawled be adversely
affected by the use of the spider, rejecting that “mere use of a spider
to enter a publicly available web site to gather information, without
more, is sufficient to fulfill the harm requirement for trespass to
chattels.”76
The California Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue where
a former company employee sent a number of emails to his former
coworkers’ corporate email accounts.77 Here, a number of emails
were sent to employees, who were given the choice to opt out of
receiving the emails. 78 Intel argued that it deserved an injunction
against the sending of those emails, as the emails were a trespass on
its server that ate up server and human resources (time spent
replying, setting up filters, etc.).79 However, the court declined to
find a trespass, as California law required some damage to the
property. Here, there was no allegation that the emails impaired the
functioning of Intel’s computers, and the emails were allowed to be
sent.80
Courts have come to vastly different conclusions about whether
trespass applies online, and have made some important points in
doing so. First, it is important to note that Intel v. Hamidi depended
on the definition of trespass, a common law concept that can differ
74

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003
WL 21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
75
Id. (noting the criticism of extending trespass to the internet).
76
Id. (disregarding the work load performed by Ticketmaster’s servers to
accommodate Tickets.com’s crawlers).
77
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299 (Cal. 2003).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 300.
80
Id. at 311.
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from one jurisdiction to another. Second, it is unclear what the
definition of damage is when applied to the use of a server. One
court found that merely using server resources was enough to find
damage, while another found that a minimal use that did not affect
the operation of the computer at issue was not enough for a court to
find damage. 81 It is unclear, based on these opinions, whether
merely using a computer’s resources constitutes damage, and if not,
how much of a computer’s resources must be used for a court to find
it was damaged. It is also unclear what sort of warnings are required
to make it known that a crawler is unwelcome. Intel v. Hamidi did
not address the issue in-depth,82 and eBay notified Bidder’s Edge in
multiple ways that their crawlers were unwelcome.83 Would merely
having a robots.txt header forbidding crawling or posting it in a
website’s ToS be enough? If any use of server resources without
permission is a trespass, then how can the operator of a crawler find
out what is in a target website’s robots.txt header or ToS without
crawling? The common law cause of action of trespass does not
provide a rule clear enough for the operators of web crawlers to
follow, and leaves enforcement largely up to websites, not end users
whose data is actually at issue. It is not enough to ensure user
privacy from web crawlers only when it is desired.
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA)84 protects
computers from unauthorized access and from access that exceeds
authorization. 85 The law provides for both criminal and civil
penalties.86 At times, courts have addressed whether unauthorized
crawling and scraping can violate the CFAA. Because the CFAA
81

Compare eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 with
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
82
Id. at 300. In fact, Intel did not appeal to Hamidi to stop sending the
messages, but merely attempted to block the receipt of them by Intel employees.
83
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
84
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
85
Id.
86
Id. § 1030(c).
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was passed in 1986, it does not incorporate web crawlers into its
provisions. It is not clear how the law would apply to such software,
as the following cases illustrate. Further, courts have been divided
over how the CFAA should be applied outside of the limited case of
web crawlers.87
In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, the First Circuit was
tasked with determining whether scraping a website violated the
CFAA. Its determination of whether access was unauthorized in this
particular case is outside the scope of this paper, as it hinged on a
confidentiality agreement signed by a former employee of the
company whose website was scraped, and not on an html header,
ToS, or other commonly used means of signaling a desire not to be
crawled or scraped.88 However, the court also looked at whether the
scraping met the damage or loss requirements of the CFAA. The
court found that EF Cultural Travel had suffered a loss due to
Explorica’s scraping, under a theory that Congress had intended loss
“to target remedial expenses borne by victims that could not
properly be considered direct damage caused by a computer
hacker.” 89 Because EF Cultural Travel had been forced to take
“diagnostic measures” to “assess whether their website had been
compromised,” 90 they had suffered a loss. Though EF Cultural
Travel suffered no physical damage, the court determined that
Congress, by specifying that either damage or loss would enable
recovery under the CFAA, had intended that no physical damage
was necessary. 91 However, nine years later, the District Court of
Maryland held that for lost revenue to qualify as a “loss” under the
CFAA, the unauthorized access in question must have caused an
interruption of service.92 Other courts have declined to follow that
definition.93
87

See Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1143–44 (2016).
88
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 (1st Cir.
2001).
89
Id. at 585 (citing In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
497, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
90
Id. at 584 & n.17.
91
Id. at 585.
92
CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, 737 F. Supp. 2d 496, 513 (D. Md. 2010).
93
See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, No. 08–cv–02772–MSK,
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In another case, AOL v. LCGM, the court held that LCGM
violated the CFAA by sending bulk email to AOL subscribers in
violation of AOL’s ToS94 and by collecting those email addresses in
violation of the same ToS.95 Again, LCGM caused AOL to incur
technical costs as a result of their actions, impaired the functioning
of AOL’s network, and damaged AOL’s goodwill.96
Over the years, courts have operated under a number of different
rules regarding when the CFAA applies. However, it seems clear
that a web crawler visiting a target website, using its resources, and
scraping it for data, could violate the CFAA. Web crawlers can
certainly operate in violation of an html header or of a ToS,97 and
they also use resources of the servers they contact, which could
cause a service disruption. Consequently, website operators wishing
to keep crawlers away from their site must expend money and
resources responding to such visits.
Nevertheless, in a recent case the Northern District of California
found there was likely no violation of the CFAA in a suit brought
by LinkedIn against hiQ, which scraped LinkedIn for publicly
accessible data in violation of LinkedIn’s ToS. 98 The court
distinguished previous cases,99 finding a CFAA violation in similar
circumstances, while noting that unlike previous cases, hiQ was
scraping public data rather than password protected parts of
2011 WL 782574, at *4 (D. Co. Feb. 25, 2011) (finding that “loss” is limited to
“cost[s]” and to “any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages
. . . incurred because of interruption of service,” and holding that lost revenue was
not a “loss”); First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp. 3d 819, 851 (C.D.
Ill. 2014) (“[T]here are two categories of statutory loss: expenses incurred while
responding to or investigating a violation, and costs incurred, or revenue lost,
because of a service disruption.”).
94
Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998).
95
Id. at 450–51.
96
Id. at 451.
97
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 87, at 1165–67 (noting that some scholars do not
think that ToS should be binding on web users, as they are rarely read, hard to
understand, and better understood as limits on liability than as limits on who can
use the website).
98
hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1108 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
99
Id. (citing United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) &
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016)).
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websites. 100 The court explained that, unlike in United States v.
Nosal or Facebook v. Power Ventures, where “unauthorized
intruders reached into what would fairly be characterized as the
private interior of a computer system not visible to the public,”101
the scraping at issue here was publicly available, without a
password, and this put it outside Congress’ intent in passing the
CFAA to prevent hacking. 102 Further, the court reasoned that
applying the CFAA in the way LinkedIn suggested “would have
sweeping consequences well beyond anything Congress could have
contemplated,” potentially creating criminal liability for “merely
viewing a website in contravention of a unilateral directive from a
private entity . . . effectuating the digital equivalence of Medusa.”103
The court also discussed how to apply the concept of trespass to
online domains, determining that social norms tell us the Web is
“inherently open,” and that the CFAA’s bar on “access without
authorization” probably does not apply to publicly available
portions of a website. 104 The court awarded hiQ a preliminary
injunction barring LinkedIn from preventing hiQ’s scraping activity
on their website.105
C. Overview of Private Sector Use
Private sector corporations are subject to significant restrictions
on what and when they can crawl. Unlike the restrictions on the
government, these restrictions are not theoretical, though they are
hardly clear-cut. It seems that corporate operators of web crawlers
may need to abide by the desires of websites to not be crawled,
whether that preference is made known in a robots.txt header, a ToS,
or otherwise. However, this is dependent on the ability and
willingness of websites to use litigation to stop crawlers from
operating on and scraping their website, leaving smaller websites
and users in a jam.
100
101
102
103
104
105

2017).

Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111 (citing Kerr, supra note 87, at 1162).
hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1120 (N.D. Cal.
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These controls on private operators of web crawlers are
available only to the operators of a website. Individual users cannot
ensure their data is not crawled or scraped, and must rely on the
operators of the websites they use to maintain their privacy against
crawlers. Given how vague case law is on the subject, it is unclear
whether users or websites can rely on these protections to keep their
data private and out of corporate databases. Many websites and
users may be unable to protect themselves, and some websites may
find it is in their interest to allow crawlers to scrape their data,
regardless of some of their users’ wishes.
For example, web forums may lack the resources and money to
defend their users’ information from those who wish to scrape it.
While some forums are quite large, most are small and likely lack
the technical, monetary, and legal resources to stop an organization
that insists on ignoring their calls to refrain from crawling and
scraping. These forums may be quite interested in protecting their
data; forums often host discussions on personal issues, including
those of sex, medical conditions, and others, and have a reputation
that they wish to maintain among their users. However, they often
do not monetize this data beyond serving ads to those who read or
post. This limits their resources and how valuable that data is to the
forum; they lose no value if another group holds the same data.
These sorts of forums may not be willing or able to protect their
users’ privacy and users have no way of signaling their desire not to
have their posts crawled, and suffer even more from a lack of
resources. Other websites, like Twitter, do monetize the data they
collect by limiting the ways that data can be culled from their service
and charging users to access the full archive of tweets.106
Social networks collect even more data than forums, and this
data is perhaps more sensitive and specific than that people post on
106

See Juliette Garside, Twitter Puts Trillions of Tweets up for Sale to Data
Miners, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/mar/18/twitter-puts-trillions-tweets-for-sale-data-miners;
Twitter firehouse vs. Twitter API: What’s the Difference and Why Should You
Care?, BRIGHTPLANET (June 25, 2013), http://www.brightplanet.com/2013/
06/twitter-firehose-vs-twitter-api-whats-the-difference-and-why-should-youcare/. See also @raffi, Twitter #DataGrants Selections, TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2014),
https://blog.twitter.com/2014/twitter-datagrants-selections
(explaining that
Twitter does supply free access to its complete archive of tweets to select
universities through its #DataGrants program).
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forums. But like forums, social networks have a reputation to
protect, and the larger ones may have significant resources and a
desire to keep whatever information they have to themselves, and
monetize it as they see fit. For example, Facebook collects, and
reveals, large amounts of data about its users. It uses the data to
make recommendations, displays news stories of potential interest,
and shows advertisements based on the information scraped. In
2018, amid a media firestorm, Facebook’s CTO confirmed that a
private company, Cambridge Analytica, surreptitiously scraped data
from 87 million users.107 The firm reportedly collected the Facebook
profiles in order to target voters during the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election.108 This incident focused international attention on the risk
of crawlers deployed by third parties harvesting detailed personal
data found on proprietary social networks.
V. ACADEMIC USE
Crawlers also have potential for academic researchers in social
science, computer science, and other fields. Internet research has
greatly expanded the methods for social analysis used by
researchers. Now, in addition to traditional surveys, researchers can
collect vast amounts of data from online communities, social media,
and various websites to answer questions on topics such as youth
attitudes, demographic change, or political beliefs.
In the same way that the government or corporations may use
web crawlers to collect sensitive data that users meant to keep
private, researchers may collect significant data on a much wider
array of issues of noncommercial general inquiry. While searching
for private, closely held beliefs and ideas can lead to valid findings,
researchers in academic institutions are bound by the same laws that
govern the private sector and have additional institutional controls
over their research.
107

Anne L. Washington, Facebook math: How 270,000 became 87 million,
DATA & SOCIETY: POINTS (April 11, 2018), https://points.datasociety.net/
facebook-math-how-270-000-became-87-million-bd8cf1009b32.
108
Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need
to Know as Fallout Widens, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-explained.html.
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The CFAA arguably stands in the way of academics who want
to use crawlers. Researchers may seek to deploy web crawlers and
other bots to gather and analyze data for basic and applied research
publications adding to literature of their disciplines. The tension
surrounding this use is not theoretical. In 2017, University of
Michigan Professor Christian Sandvig, his academic colleagues, and
the news organization First Look Media Works, intended to conduct
research on online discrimination using methods including web
crawlers where such conduct is prohibited by the CFAA. The ACLU
filed a lawsuit on their behalf against the U.S. Attorney General over
the CFAA’s criminalization of such research activities according to
the website’s ToS.109 The plaintiffs are concerned that conducting
their research with crawlers, which they allege will cause no harm
to the websites they study, will expose them to significant criminal
liability. The case has not yet been decided on the merits, but they
have been allowed to move forward with an as-applied challenge to
the CFAA on the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses of the First
Amendment. Even if their case is successful, the website ToS will
remain in force and they may be prohibited from accessing the
websites themselves or be subject to civil actions.
Academics performing studies have more oversight on their
research than some other actors. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
are tasked with reviewing and approving proposed human research
by academics. IRBs are supposed to ensure that researchers obtain
informed consent from their subjects and do not expose them to
undue risk of harm.
However, there are number of problems with the IRB process.
First, they often take a long time to complete their reviews (often
months), keeping them slightly behind the newest technology. They
also may not necessarily understand the problems associated with
collecting data online; while using publicly available data posted on
the web may not appear to be human subjects research, such data
use clearly can have significant impact on the lives of those who
posted it. Finally, many researchers use “found” data, or data that
has been collected by another entity, which is either publicly
109

See Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 16–1368 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881, at *45, (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018). The CFAA, for example, also acts upon academic
users of web crawlers.
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available online or given to them by a private company, without
further review. 110 This allows researchers to avoid institutional
review even when they are subjecting the data to new analysis and
may uncover novel findings about those who posted the data online.
Such use creates another point of failure where personally
identifiable information can be revealed or data can be leaked.
Considering the possible problems with avoiding review in this way
is made more important in light of recent calls for researchers to
open up the data they use in their research and to share it with others
in their field.111
Academic researchers need clearer rules about mandatory
review of the analyses they wish to perform on this sort of data, even
when it is collected by another entity. Academic actors collect
information and perform studies on topics that are just as sensitive
as the projects carried out by the government. They study religion,
sex, gender, and a host of other topics, many times focusing on
vulnerable or disenfranchised populations. Institutions reviewing
this sort of research need to ensure that the studies they produce are
conducted with respect for the privacy of those using the internet
and that the data collected is handled and saved responsibly.
VI. APPLICATION
Given this state of affairs, users may enjoy some degree of
privacy online, even in the information that they post publicly.
However, the existing laws and guidelines governing the use of web
crawlers to gather information on the web are inadequate to the task
110
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (exempting from the human research
subjects policy “Research, involving the collection or study of existing data,
documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these
sources are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator
in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers
linked to the subjects.”).
111
See, e.g., Paige Shaklee, New Data Journal Lets Researchers Share
Their Data Open Access, ELSEVIER CONNECT (Sep. 9, 2014),
https://www.elsevier.com/connect/new-data-journal-lets-researchers-share-theirdata-open-access (“[E]ach piece of data that has been carefully and thoughtfully
gathered has value. Often, you don't know what future value that data will have
until you've shared it with colleagues in the scientific community.”).
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of protecting privacy interests. While the courts have not dealt with
government surveillance using web crawlers, a wide search could
turn up enough information, in aggregate, to create a search subject
to the Fourth Amendment. Just as tracking a person with a GPS unit
for 30 days reveals much about that person’s life, so could crawling
and scraping enough data about a particular person. Such searches
threaten to reveal nearly everything about a person’s life without the
knowledge of those being searched. 112 Law enforcement also
recognizes that using online material for policing purposes requires
walking a fine line. The Bureau of Justice Assistance produced a
report recommending that police departments institute policies
governing when such tools can be used, what authorization is
needed, and how collected data should be stored.113
A similar expectation of privacy exists against privately
operated web crawlers, though this expectation is largely
enforceable only by the website hosting the information, not the end
user. While online trespass is not widely accepted as a good idea
among the legal community, and the CFAA was not aimed
specifically at protecting from this kind of harm, these bodies of law
do provide some protection against robot searches. Such crawls, if
unwanted, could create a private cause of action against those
operating the web crawlers, though there are practical concerns to
enforcing such a prohibition on crawling.
Beyond the legal norms discouraging unwanted crawling and
scraping of data from websites, ethical and social norms are in place.
Facebook, whose founder once said that privacy was no longer a
social norm, has changed its sharing default from “public” to
“friends.”114 Eighty-six percent of internet users have taken some
112

These could reveal locations from check-ins and photos on social
networks, opinions about politics, social movements, and literature, names of
friends and acquaintances, product reviews on online marketplaces, and more.
113
Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and
Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations, GLOBAL JUSTICE INFO.
SHARING
INITIATIVE
ADVISORY
COMM.,
at
9
(Feb.
2013),
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/Developing%20a%20Policy%20on%20the%20U
se%20of%20Social%20Media%20in%20Intelligence%20and%20Inves....pdf.
114
See Molly Wood, Facebook Generation Rekindles Expectation of
Privacy
Online,
N.Y.
TIMES:
BITS
(Sept.
7,
2014),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/rethinking-privacy-on-the-
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step to remain private online, and sixty-eight percent say that
stronger laws are needed to protect people’s online privacy. 115
People attempt to guard their identity, keep information from
specific people or organizations, and care quite strongly that they
control who has access to much of their information.116
To ensure that internet users’ privacy is maintained, more work
is needed to put in place strong administrative and legal protections.
At the moment, it is unclear how the law applies to web crawlers in
all jurisdictions. Private sector actors, including academic
institutions, have weak controls on their use of these tools. More
accountability is needed, and clearer rules need to be put in place to
ensure that web crawlers are not abused and internet users do not
suffer undue harm. The remainder of this paper will discuss some of
the policy questions that need to be considered while crafting these
rules.
VII. POLICY DILEMMAS
Internet users have certain expectations about their use that web
crawlers may confound. Certain social norms exist surrounding use
of the Internet and particular websites on it. For example, when users
post an update on Facebook, they expect that post is for the use and
enjoyment of their friends. Though it may be available to the public,
most people are unlikely to think that their posts will be scrutinized
and used to profile them. 117 Further, many websites have rules
prohibiting web crawling, contributing to the belief that people’s
data will not be scooped up by a bot sent on a mission to find any
data that it can. Government, corporate, and university web crawling

internet/?_r=0.
115
See Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymityprivacy-and-security-online/.
116
Id.
117
See Motahhare Eslami et al., “I Always Assumed that I Wasn’t Really
That Close to [Her]”: Reasoning About Invisible Algorithms in News Feed, 33
PROC. ANN. ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY (ACM) CONF. ON HUMAN
FACTORS COMPUTING SYSS. (CHI 2015) 153 (2015), http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~csandvig/research/Eslami_Algorithms_CHI15.pdf.
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shatters that expectation.118 It allows large organizations to build a
comprehensive profile on any person or organization it would like
to, at very low cost to those operating web crawlers.
A. Metadata
Crawlers allow for the compilation of a significant amount of
metadata about users. This metadata can be extremely revealing, is
often unprotected, and may not be protected from government
search under the Fourth Amendment. With some effort, metadata
from anonymous accounts could be linked to a real identity,
meaning that users could not escape being tracked by using an alias
or username not plainly associated with them. A person’s religious
views, medical status, or other personal information could be
determined just from viewing metadata.
This information could be embarrassing, used against people in
courts or among the public, and could be data that a person never
wanted linked back to their real identity. Using web crawlers to
collect and index this sort of data could thwart all of those
expectations.
B. Exclusions and Bias
Crawlers do not, and perhaps cannot, search everything. They
will inevitably miss information, fail to search some websites, or
mistakenly believe that some information is not relevant to its search
and fail to collect it. As with all other methods of data collection,
some people and data will be excluded from the searches conducted
by crawlers. What this means for those operating web crawlers is
not entirely known. In the context of the government, it means that
searches for criminals will never be perfect. For corporations or
researchers, it means that searches designed to study a given
community will miss people, and fail to provide a full picture. This
could bias any resulting conclusions drawn from such data, and
require that those directing searches consider how inclusive their
search will be and ways to correct for such exclusion bias.
Searches conducted with crawlers will suffer from more
118

Though, after the release of the Snowden documents, people may be
more aware of the surveillance they are subject to online. See also Esposito et al.,
supra note 20.
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traditional forms of bias. Just as someone drafting questions for an
opinion poll may chose words that push people towards a certain
answer, programmers may choose search terms, or construct their
algorithms in such a way that their bots are drawn to certain types
of data, and hence certain types of answers. This also leaves open
the possibility that the searching organization may miss someone,
mistakenly associate someone with an act, or may make improper
conclusions on which policy will be based.119
Not all of these are strictly privacy problems. The fact that
someone was not found by a crawler is surely a good thing for their
privacy, but may be bad for public policy. At the same time,
invading peoples’ privacy imperfectly leaves open the possibility
that action will be taken against people who, in truth, should be left
to lead their lives in peace. Controls need to be put in place based
on realistic abilities of web crawlers in finding information to ensure
that does not happen.
C. Data Security
Collecting large amounts of data makes one a target for hackers
and opens the possibility of data leaks. As discussed above, this data
can be sensitive and can paint a detailed picture of a person’s life.
Government agencies have not yet found practical ways to secure
their data, and have publicly failed to do so.120 Before they embark
on additional data collection initiatives, any actor needs to ensure
that it can keep the information it does collect safe. This means
strong access controls, employing encryption to protect the data,
ensuring that employees practice good ‘cyber hygiene,’ that
computers are regularly updated, and that steps are taken against
unauthorized outside access.
119

See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1267 (2008).
120
See The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized Our
National Security for More than a Generation, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM MAJORITY STAFF
REPORT (Sep. 7, 2016), available at https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breach-How-the-GovernmentJeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Generation.pdf.
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D. Future Uses
Just as internet users probably do not expect their data to be
collected and used for government purposes when they post on
Facebook or one of the many forums that exist, they certainly do not
expect their data to be used in the future for purposes not yet
imagined. Data storage is increasingly inexpensive and allows for
the long-term storage, and therefore the long-term use, of collected
data. 121 While many of the things that people post online fade in
their ability to cause embarrassment or harm with age, many do not,
and some may in fact end up more potent in that regard.
If organizations are to collect data with web crawlers, even in a
limited scheme, it must consider whether it plans to maximize the
amount of data it collects, over-collecting and storing indefinitely,
or minimize its data, discarding it as it is used or after a given time
period, during which it is put to no use. Data should, in all cases, be
minimized to protect the privacy of internet users, who should not
have to worry that decades after posting, their youthful indiscretions
will haunt them because a government crawler saved a post.
E. Unfair or False Light, Undue Harm, and False Positives
Related to some of the other concerns listed here, data could be
used to paint some internet users in an unfair or false light. Failing
to fully collect data about people, or using only part of the data
collected, could make a person look bad for failure to consider
context or the full picture. This sort of risk can be reduced by
controlling how data will be used, who has access to it, and how
long it is kept. Use of this data could cause severe harm to some
internet users, and may point a guilty finger at innocent users.
Organizations employing web crawlers to collect data should
consider what level of certainty is required before they can employ
their data. There should also be procedural hurdles before such data
121

Lucas Mearian, CW@50: Data Storage Goes from $1M to 2 Cents per
Gigabyte
(+Video),
COMPUTERWORLD
(Mar.
23,
2017),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3182207/data-storage/cw50-datastorage-goes-from-1m-to-2-cents-per-gigabyte.html (noting that from the year
2000 to 2017, the cost of a gigabyte stored on a disk drive has dropped from $7.70
to $0.02).
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can be used; just as the criminal justice system is governed by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, programs using data from web crawlers
need similar, if less lofty, standards governing their actions.
F. Misuse of Data
There is also the possibility of deliberate misuse of data.
Individual employees may use their resources to further their own
ends, or simply for entertainment. Proper access controls and good
security can significantly reduce the risk of this and protect internet
users swept up by web crawlers from significant embarrassment and
possibly serious harm.
G. Vulnerable Populations
Many vulnerable, hidden, or marginalized populations use the
online technologies to communicate to find support.122 Sometimes
this is done in the open on Twitter, in forums, or through other
clients that keep records of their discussions on the open, searchable
web. Government agencies may decide some of these populations
need to be watched, either for their own safety or the safety of others.
This could do significant damage to such communities, causing
them to disband after discovering they are under surveillance, or
subjecting them to discrimination because of what is found in
discussions they never intended for outsiders.
H. Chilling Speech
Finally, government surveillance can have the effect of chilling
speech. Those who know the government is crawling the web to
record conversations, metadata, and other information may choose
not to have conversations or not to go online in the first place. This
has significant social costs, and the government should consider the
public, civic, and social goods that the internet fosters before it takes
actions that could hinder those acts that make the internet so
122

See
e.g.,
UNHCR,
Connectivity
for
Refugees,
www.unhcr.org/innovation/connectivity-for-refugees/ (last visited May 8, 2018);
see also THE ECONOMIST, Phones are now Indispensable for Refugees, Feb. 11,
2017.
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valuable.
VIII. HOW TO TREAT ROBOTS ONLINE
The internet is undoubtedly an open place that users should be
able to surf free of fear from legal action over trespass from website
operators with extreme ToS or other usage controls.123 However, the
widespread use of web crawlers to collect information may
confound the expectations of many internet users who do not have
full knowledge of how the internet works and what bots are capable
of. People may understand that their comments will persist, and may
be linked to their identity, but the abilities enabled by bots go beyond
the risk that a stray comment or account will be linked to a real
identity.
Internet users take part in online communities with expectations
as to how those communities operate and how their contributions
will be maintained. They largely assume that humans and the service
they are using will read their posts and review their activity, not
some outside party. Website owners also have expectations that they
will be able to monetize the data they collect, and that data will not
be taken without compensation.
Web crawlers confound these expectations by giving anyone the
ability, with relatively few resources, to collect huge amounts of
information posted online. While this may threaten business models,
it also threatens the assumption of relative obscurity that many users
depend on when they partake in online forums. The scale on which
robots, and not humans, can collect information, is the relevant
consideration in determining whether websites should be allowed to
control access by robots.
Web crawlers may require different handling. Website owners
should be able to count on robots.txt to guide robots that access their
webpages. This would allow website owners to make it clear which
pages robots can access and perhaps, how often, and is a clear line
for courts trying to apply trespass or other authorized access laws to
the internet.
The analysis is not entirely dissimilar from the analysis applied
123

Kerr, supra note 87, at 1162.
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by the court in hiQ v. LinkedIn.124 While the court there proposed
that the situation is more similar to a shop that has “displayed a sign
in its storefront window visible to all on a public street and
sidewalk,” where “it could not ban an individual from looking at the
sign and subject such person to trespass for violating such a ban,”125
the analogy ignores the fact that online, one cannot look at a shop
without entering it. A more apt analogy may be if someone walked
into that same shop with a scanner, and saved digital copies of its
wares for later reproduction and use. Nevertheless, robots.txt could
be seen as analogical to a shop owner restricting the manner and
scope of access to a physical store.
Enabling website owners to undertake civil actions for violations
of their robots.txt restrictions acts similarly to trespass norms;
owners can decide who is allowed on to their property, and for what
purposes. This solution is not perfect for a number of reasons. It
leaves owners of websites in charge of determining and enforcing
the wishes of their users, and leaves some web crawler users who
people might want to allow to have their information, such as
researchers, without that access. This can occur in cases where
website owners are indiscriminate in their rulemakings or limit
access by corporate entities that publish databases used by
researchers. Limiting the rules specifically to bots also addresses
some of the possible negative outcomes of applying the CFAA to
scraping that the court noted in hiQ ––namely, consequences
ranging from racial or gender discrimination to illiberal political
outcomes.126
However, owners of websites are far more likely to be
responsive to users’ wishes than the more detached third parties
operating web crawlers. Additionally, those who want access to the
information currently gathered with web crawlers can negotiate for
it, something that already happens with many websites like
Twitter.127 This leaves website owners in control of who can gather
124

See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal.

2017).
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See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, Google Confirms New Experiment with
Twitter in Search Results, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 4, 2015),
126
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the information on their websites and users relatively sure that third
parties will not scrape their data, so they can continue to use the
websites of their choice for the purposes they intend.
CONCLUSION
The idea that any and all information on the web is openly
accessible and available and therefore can be freely crawled and
scraped is wrongheaded. This article demonstrates that actors
engaged in these practices across sectors should be aware of the
legal factors that discourage crawling and scraping websites for
large amounts of data, and the ethical and social factors that argue
in favor of close control of crawling in some cases.
Clearly establishing and strengthening legal rules and
accountability mechanisms that regulate government, the private
sector, academia, and individuals is necessary. The CFAA and
trespass doctrine may operate to keep any type of actor from
crawling a website and gathering information, but the application of
those laws to the internet is unclear, and it can be difficult for the
crawled, particularly smaller institutions, to protect themselves
under those laws. The government may be further bound by the
Fourth Amendment, though the judiciary has yet to make it clear
how the Third-Party Doctrine and aggregation principle should bear
on the Fourth Amendment in the electronic world and on the
internet. Even academia is bound by relatively lax rules, governed
only by IRBs.
Without stronger rules and greater accountability, internet users
are left open to severe privacy invasions. Their blogs, Facebook and
Twitter pages, reviews, photos, discussions on forums can all be
scraped, saved, analyzed, and used later for purposes and by people
that the users never intended. Though many actors have some rules
self-governing their use of crawlers, the rules as a whole are too
weak, and holding them accountable is too difficult.
This article presented a number of issues that need to be
considered when updating the existing rules governing online
surveillance using web crawlers. These issues need to be considered
https://searchengineland.com/is-this-googles-twitter-integration-into-the-searchresults-220240.
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in writing these new rules. Failing to consider them could result in
laws that continue to protect a too-narrow view of privacy, or that
fail to prevent all the harms that could befall internet users.

